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Although national boundaries dividing European historians from each other are
tenacious, divisions by period are sometimes more so. The history of France
in the sixteenth century is sometimes treated quite separately from that of sub-
sequent centuries. Indeed, sixteenth-century European historians frequently pay
greater attention to France than French historians pay to the sixteenth century.
Sixteenth-century European historians care about France because the French
Wars of Religion occupy a central position in sixteenth-century international re-
lations and political history, as well as because Calvin, France’s leading reformer,
was extraordinarily influential internationally.1 Great historians whose work has
*The books discussed in this essay are Thierry Amalou, Une concorde urbaine: Senlis
au temps des réformes ðvers 1520–vers 1580Þ ðLimoges: Presses Universitaires de Li-
moges, 2007Þ, pp. 437, €28.00; Stuart Carroll, Martyrs and Murderers: The Guise Fam-
ily and the Making of Europe ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2009Þ, pp. xiv1345,
$45.00 ðclothÞ, $19.95 ðpaperÞ; Barbara B. Diefendorf, From Penitence to Charity: Pious
Women and the Catholic Reformation in Paris ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2004Þ,
pp. ix1340, $65.00 ðclothÞ, $40.00 ðpaperÞ; Jill Fehleison, Boundaries of Faith: Catho-
lics and Protestants in the Diocese of Geneva ðKirksville, MO: Truman State University
Press, 2010Þ, pp. viii1269, $48.00; Bruce Gordon, Calvin ðNew Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2009Þ, pp. xiii1398, $25.00; Mark Greengrass, Governing Passions: Peace
and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576–1585 ðOxford: Oxford University Press,
2007Þ, pp. xiii1423, $165.00; Jonathan A. Reid, King’s Sister—Queen of Dissent:
Marguerite of Navarre ð1492–1549Þ and Her Evangelical Network, 2 vols. ðLeiden:
Brill, 2009Þ, pp. xxii1795, $277.00; and Jason Zuidema and Theodore Van Raalte,
Early French Reform: The Theology and Spirituality of Guillaume Farel ðAldershot:
Ashgate, 2011Þ, pp. 262, $119.95. Many thanks to Katie Crawford for her reading of
this essay.
1 These barriers have also discouraged scholarship; Americans in particular have gen-
erally studied more recent periods of French history. I have not seen up-to-date statis-
tics on this, but for the 1980s and earlier, see T. J. Schaeper, “French History as Written
on Both Sides of the Atlantic—a Comparative Analysis,” French Historical Studies 17
ðSpring 1991Þ: 233–48, and J. Rothney, “Trends in French Historical Studies, 1976–
1985,” French Historical Studies 14 ðFall 1986Þ: 595–603. Note that at least some British
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been read by others regardless of subspecialty—including Natalie Zemon Davis,
Lucien Febvre, and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie—have worked on the period.
However, as Robin Briggs has remarked, “the sixteenth century has only partly
lost its position as the poor relation of French historical writing in the modern
era.”2 Seizièmistes ðscholars of sixteenth-century FranceÞ have sometimes exacer-
bated the problem by conducting their debates in isolation from French history
as a whole. Some of the studies reviewed here, although important and interest-
ing, are constructed in such a way as to unnecessarily exclude nonspecialists.
My purpose in this essay is therefore to build some scholarly bridges by ex-
plaining the importance of recent scholarship to non-seizièmistes, whether they
are historians of France in other centuries or historians who study other places. I
intend to give an overview of the religious history of the period 1520–1648 and
its significance for European history by discussing the books reviewed here in
chronological order while highlighting two major issues. The first issue is why
the French Reformation ultimately failed to persuade the majority of French
people to convert, despite the astonishing successes of the Protestant movement
in the late 1550s and early 1560s. The central argument of the most persuasive
recent work, it seems to me, is that although religious motivations were the spark,
the political context was crucial to both the movement’s initial success and its
eventual failure. This is admittedly the latest round in a debate that has been
around for a long time.3 But there have also been significant scholarly advances.
Rather than just redebating which is more important, religious zeal or political
calculation, this new research allows us to start making more precise state-
ments about what motives were most salient in which cases. One of the great
achievements of Philip Benedict’s Rouen and the Wars of Religion ð1981Þ was
that it inspired a raft of local studies that have added immensely to our knowl-
edge, and some general patterns can now be discerned.4 However, religion
2 Robin Briggs, Early Modern France, 1560–1715, 2nd ed. ðOxford, 1998Þ, 2.
3 For some previous rounds in the debate, see Susan Rosa and Dale Van Kley, “Reli-
gion and the Historical Discipline: A Reply to Mack Holt and Henry Heller,” French
Historical Studies 21 ðAutumn 1998Þ: 611–29;Mack P. Holt, “Religion, HistoricalMethod,
and Historical Forces: A Rejoinder,” French Historical Studies 19 ðSpring 1996Þ: 863–73;
Henry Heller, “Putting History Back into the Religious Wars: A Reply to Mack P. Holt,”
French Historical Studies 19 ðSpring 1996Þ: 853–61; Mack P. Holt, “Putting Religion
Back into the Wars of Religion,” French Historical Studies 18 ðAutumn 1993Þ: 524–51.
The older literature can be sampled in J. H. M. Salmon, The French Wars of Religion:
How Important Were Religious Factors? ðBoston, 1967Þ.
4 Some of the more important local studies are Michel Cassan, Le temps des guerres
de religion: Le cas du Limousin ðvers 1530–vers 1630Þ ðParis, 1996Þ; Stéphane Gal,
Grenoble au temps de la Ligue ðGrenoble, 2000Þ; Wolfgang Kaiser, Marseille au temps
des troubles, 1559–1596: Morphologie sociale et luttes de factions, trans. Florence
Chaix ðParis, 1992Þ; Nicole Lemaître, Le Rouergue flamboyant: Le clergé et les fidèles
historians see America as the font of French Reformation scholarship: see, e.g., Geoffrey
Treasure, The Huguenots ðNew Haven, CT, 2013Þ, xii.
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affected politics too—which leads to the second issue. As Arlette Jouanna has
recently argued in her excellent study of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre,
the results of the Wars of Religion marked an important turning point in the
history of the French state, leading to a decisive shift in power toward the
crown and away from both the localities and representative institutions.5 After
Henri IVðr. 1589–1610Þ, France was likely neither to develop parliamentary in-
stitutions on the English model nor to devolve into something akin to the Holy
Roman Empire, as had seemed plausible at times both before and during the
wars. Paradoxically, while the Wars of Religion temporarily threatened the mon-
archy, in the long run they reinforced its centrality. After Henri IV’s restoration
of royal control, the way was open for Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV. At the
same time, the failures of the period—particularly in the realm of royal finance—
made some of the crown’s serious weaknesses more intractable and contributed
to the coming of the Revolution.
II. Creating a Community
French evangelical reform begins with the “Circle of Meaux,” whose evangeli-
cal bishop Guillaume Briçonnet began a series of reforms beginning in 1516,
employing a number of like-minded priests in his efforts. The group eventually
split up under pressure from the authorities; some of the members remained
within the Catholic fold, while others took the more dangerous path of affirming
their adherence to new forms of Christianity that came to be known as Protes-
tantism. Among the most important of these early Protestants was Guillaume
Farel ð1489–1565Þ, who fled France to become the leading preacher of Geneva.
Farel was an important theologian in his own right, as well as an important men-
tor for John Calvin. Thanks to Jason Zuidema and Theodore Van Raalte’s Early
French Reform: The Theology and Spirituality of Guillaume Farel, a collection
of texts with an extensive introduction, students and scholars of the French Ref-
ormation now have good access to an important figure who was a key member
of the early French Reformed milieu.6 For Zuidema and Van Raalte, Farel’s key
goal was to strengthen Christians’ connection to God by teaching that there was
du diocèse de Rodez, 1417–1563 ðParis, 1988Þ; Kevin C. Robbins, City on the Ocean
Sea: La Rochelle, 1530–1650; Urban Society, Religion, and Politics on the French
Atlantic Frontier ðLeiden, 1997Þ; and Penny Roberts, A City in Conflict: Troyes during
the French Wars of Religion ðManchester, 1996Þ. I have also contributed to this genre:
Allan A. Tulchin, That Men Would Praise the Lord: The Triumph of Protestantism in
Nîmes, 1530–1570 ðNew York, 2010Þ; see the conclusion, 181–200, for my analysis of
the patterns of success and failure of the French Reformation.
5 Arlette Jouanna, The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre: The Mysteries of a Crime
of State, trans. Joseph Bergin ðManchester, 2013Þ, esp. 202–6.
6 Farel is not otherwise well served in English. The standard sources on him are Pierre
Barthel, Rémy Scheurer, and Richard Stauffer, eds., Actes du colloque Guillaume Farel,
2 vols. ðGeneva, 1983Þ, and Guillaume Farel, 1489–1565 ðNeuchâtel, 1930Þ.
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only one road to Him—through Jesus. Many French Christians found the prom-
ise of a closer connection to God immensely appealing, although others found
Farel’s single-minded approach positively frightening. The nascent French Prot-
estant movement used Farel’s prayers to create a sense of community.
Students today are commonly introduced to Luther via his pamphlets and to
Calvin via his Institutes of the Christian Religion ð1536Þ, but Van Raalte argues,
acutely, that most sixteenth-century people probably encountered Protestant
theology by listening to preachers and—especially—hearing prayers. After all,
a major point of Reformation theology was to help Christians connect more
directly to God, and praying was the primary way of doing so ð31–33, 93Þ.7
Van Raalte begins by noting that Farel was opposed to the mantra-like repeti-
tion of prayers, or “muttering” ð72Þ, because it was “against the command of
Christ” ð40–42Þ. Arguably, Farel objected to such practices because he wanted
Christians to focus on the meaning of the prayers, not on the act of praying.
Farel’s Le Pater Noster et le Credo ð1524Þ is noteworthy because it is a work
about prayer that is itself written in the form of a prayer ð50Þ. The text is heavily
indebted to Luther, but it is not merely a translation: Van Raalte calculates that
111 of its 397 lines were Farel’s independent composition ð56Þ. Lengthy written
prayers ðFarel’s were not shortÞ were more than acceptable, but the point was to
move the heart, not to empty the mind ð60Þ. Above all, Farel was reacting against
later medieval “devotionalism,” the “emotionalism, superstition, individualism, af-
fectivism, sentimentality, and pietism” ð36–38Þ that he thought distracted people
from directing their prayers where it counted—to Jesus. That does not mean that
Farel’s own prayers were inimical to Catholics—in fact, some of his prayers
ðlightly editedÞ were published in Catholic editions ð68Þ. Farel also appears to
have introduced psalm-singing to French-speaking audiences ð85Þ. This would
prove probably the most significant factor in creating a sense of community and
spirituality among French Protestants.8
Zuidema and Van Raalte conclude that Farel aimed chiefly “to move hearts—
to prayer, to confession, to reformation, to request the very things God has
promised, in particular his word” ð89Þ. Farel particularly favored as a means of
achieving this the image of the sursum corda, the lifting up of the heart to God.
Farel’s liturgy for the Lord’s Supper states, right before distributing the Bread,
“Therefore lift up your hearts on high, seeking the things which are above in
heaven where Jesus Christ is seated at the right hand of the Father. Do not let
7 To be sure, Luther’s pamphlets had an enormous circulation: see Miriam Usher
Chrisman, Lay Culture, Learned Culture: Books and Social Change in Strasbourg,
1480–1599 ðNew Haven, CT, 1982Þ, and her Bibliography of Strasbourg Imprints,
1480–1599 ðNew Haven, CT, 1982Þ. On preaching, see Larissa Taylor, Soldiers of Christ:
Preaching in Late Medieval and Reformation France ðOxford, 1992Þ.
8 Barbara B. Diefendorf, “The Huguenot Psalter and the Faith of French Protestants
in the Sixteenth Century,” in Culture and Identity in Early Modern Europe ð1500–1800Þ,
ed. Diefendorf and Carla Hesse ðAnn Arbor, MI, 1993Þ, 41–63.
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yourself be held back by visible things which become corrupt through use” ð215Þ.
The Christian heart must be elevated through prayer so that it cannot idolize
material things ð27Þ. Farel’s liturgy, and his explanation of it, also emphasize that
the breaking of the Bread signifies that “those who take and break the one bread
are one body” ð208Þ. This emphasizes—following a line of interpretation high-
lighted most recently by Christopher Elwood—that the sacrament of the Bread
created the Christian community and separated the nascent Protestant churches
from their neighbors.9
The strength and the weakness of Farel’s approach was that it created a clear
path—but only one path—to salvation, followingMatt. 7:13–14 ðNRSVÞ: “Enter
through the narrow gate; for the gate is wide and the road is easy that leads to
destruction, and there are many who take it. For the gate is narrow and the road
is hard that leads to life, and there are few who find it.” Farel drew sharp contrasts
between right and wrong, salvation and damnation, Protestants and Catholics.
This can be seen most clearly in the major work included in this volume, Farel’s
Summary and Brief Exposition ð117–80Þ. It gives a fair summary of Reformed
theology as it was understood in the early 1530s before Calvin published his In-
stitutes, which proposed a new and important explanation of the meaning of the
Eucharist ðdiscussed belowÞ. As the editors note ð18–20Þ, the Summary starts
off, following earlier commentators, with a series of chapters that propose a se-
ries of contrasting definitions—chapter 1 discusses God, chapter 2 Man, and so
forth—with the aim of indicating to readers exactly what they should and should
not do. God is good and omnipotent, Man is wicked and weak; the flesh ðchap. 8Þ
is the old man, the spirit ðchap. 9Þ is the new one, by which God “renews man
and gives him his grace” ð126Þ. For those who still associate Calvin with mak-
ing predestination part of Protestant doctrine, it is worth emphasizing that be-
fore Calvin Farel already preached predestination quite clearly: “Before the world
was created, God foresaw and elected his own” ð176Þ. He cited as his proof text
Matt. 25:34 ðNRSVÞ: “Then the king will say to those at his right hand, ‘Come,
you that are blessed by my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from
the foundation of the world.’” The effect is to create a sharp sense of distinction
between Farel’s Protestant followers and their neighbors who chose to remain
within the Catholic Church.
Zuidema and Van Raalte’s analysis here conforms to the standard historical
understanding of the reformers’ theology, but focusing on Farel’s liturgy allows
us to get a sense of the deep emotional connections he could create for his
listeners if they were prepared to make the effort. In particular, by insisting that
Farel was most passionate about prayer and the liturgy, Zuidema and Van Raalte
alter the stereotypical view of Farel as “a fiery-tempered and long-winded
9 As Zuidema and Van Raalte note, their approach builds on that of Christopher El-
wood, The Body Broken ðOxford, 1999Þ, 43.
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reforming preacher” ð3Þ.10 Farel could indeed put off his contemporaries: Calvin
broke with him when Farel married a teenager at the age of sixty-five.11 None-
theless, contemporaries also found Farel tremendously appealing, and Zuidema
and Van Raalte correctly insist that he contributed more to theology, liturgy,
and the formation of the Protestant community than scholars have generally
given him credit for. In the end, however, communities chose whether or not to
follow Farel and the other reformers based on whether they found this stripped-
down, focused path compelling and practical or arid and constraining, as well as
on other, more mundane considerations. Not every audience will react well to a
high moral tone. Calls for closing monastic houses and using the proceeds to
benefit the poor, for example, were more likely to be well received when people
felt that the poor were desperately underserved.
Through liturgy and preaching, Farel and the other reformers tried to spread
the Gospel. As they did so, they necessarily had to make their way through the
complicated world they inhabited. Jonathan Reid reconsiders the early spread
of the French Reformation by studying Marguerite d’Angoulême ð1492–1549Þ,
Queen of Navarre ðafter her marriage to Henri d’Albret in 1527Þ, and her evan-
gelical network. Marguerite is most well known today as a writer, in particular
as the author of the Heptameron ðfirst published, posthumously, in 1558Þ. How-
ever, she also had a strong interest in theological issues and an evangelical bent,
as can be seen in her best-known theological work, The Mirror of the Sinful
Soul ð1531Þ. Almost equally important for Reid’s story, she was also a major
player at the court of her brother, King François I ðr. 1515–47Þ, particularly in
the first half of his reign. Reid shows how political support at court was crucial
to the survival of the early Protestant movement, as well as how Marguerite’s
personal situation affected her personal theology, which gradually diverged
from the rest of the Protestant movement.
Reid’s study makes two main contributions. First, he shows just how central
Marguerite was to the early French Reformation. Although Marguerite’s impor-
tance as a patron of evangelicals has long been known in a general way, the
web of connections Reid documents is simply astonishing. ðThe book does
not use social network analysis formally, but I hope it will demonstrate to the
scholarly community the importance of studying networks.Þ12 Marguerite corre-
10 Indeed, in G. N. Clark et al., The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 2, The Ref-
ormation, ed. G. R. Elton ðCambridge, 1968Þ, 113, Farel is described as a man of “mod-
erate learning, little practical sense, but fiery and fearless eloquence.”
11 John T. McNeill, The History and Character of Calvinism ðOxford, 1954Þ, 189, and
Heiko Oberman, “Calvin and Farel: the Dynamics of Legitimation in Early Calvinism,”
Journal of Early Modern History 2 ð1998Þ: 32–60, at 43–44. Oberman’s article is listed
in Zuidema and Van Raalte’s bibliography.
12 Scholars wishing to get a sense of social network analysis ðSNAÞ applied to early
modern Europe should consult John Frederick Padgett and Walter W. Powell, eds., The
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sponded with and protected Guillaume Briçonnet, the bishop of Meaux, who
in turn lodged and supported Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples. Clément Marot, whose
translations of Psalms were used by French Protestants for their services, served
at her court beginning in 1518. Marguerite selected Guillaume du Bellay to
accompany her when she visited her brother the king during his captivity in
Spain in 1525 ð1:372Þ. Guillaume ða generalÞ and his brother Jean du Bellay
ðwho became a cardinal, due at least in part to Marguerite’s sponsorshipÞ de-
cisively influenced the Sorbonne to recommend Henry VIII’s divorce in 1530.
François Rabelais served as Jean du Bellay’s private secretary and physician.
Marguerite also corresponded with foreign reformers, including Jean Sturm and
Martin Bucer. She offered Guillaume Farel a post ðwhich he refusedÞ. In 1525–26,
three presses strongly linked to the Navarrian network published three-quarters
of the twenty-nine known evangelical works in French ð1:286Þ.
In short, from an early date the Protestant movement benefited greatly from
high-powered political support. Marguerite not only frequently saved heretics
from the flames, which could obviously be crucial, but also used her patronage
to name evangelicals to important positions. Her patronage of preachers and
teachers surely helped win converts to the evangelical cause, although that does
not mean that the Navarrian network created the Protestant movement in France.
Reid discusses the case of Claude Baduel ð2:516–519Þ, a French humanist and
the author of orations, educational works, annotated editions, and a Greek
dictionary. Marguerite recommended Baduel to be the first head of the Univer-
sity and College of Arts in Nîmes, his birthplace, and he became an important
leader of the Protestant movement there. While the movement existed before
he arrived ðthere are good reports of Protestants in town as early as 1537Þ and
grew dramatically after he left—he was forced to flee to Geneva in 1551—he
was undoubtedly influential. Charles and Pierre Rozel, who later became the
political spokesmen for the Protestant movement in Nimes, were his brothers-
in-law.13
Second, Reid shows that Marguerite favored a consistent ideological posi-
tion, namely, a conservative, “magisterial” ðelite-ledÞ Reformation. Her views
were thus quite similar to those of many of her contemporaries among the
German princes and King Henry VIII of England. Over time, that position be-
came more and more difficult to maintain, however. The French crown did
have substantial political inducements favoring religious reform. Charles V’s
inheritance essentially gave him control of Italy and therefore of the papacy,
13 Some of the details of Baduel’s career come from my own research: see Tulchin,
That Men Would Praise the Lord, esp. 36–39. The standard biography, still very much
worth reading, is Mathieu-Jules Gaufrès, Claude Baduel et la réforme des études au XVIe
siècle ðParis, 1880Þ.
Emergence of Organizations and Markets ðPrinceton, NJ, 2012Þ, as well as Padgett’s other
articles on the Medici. The standard textbook for SNA is Stanley Wasserman and Kather-
ine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications ðCambridge, 1994Þ.
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and it threatened to give him European hegemony. Charles promoted himself as
the standard-bearer of Catholic orthodoxy, but he posed a danger both to the pope
and to France, and he thwarted François’s attempts to gain what he saw as his
Italian inheritance. François tried to gain alliances, primarily with the pope but
also with the Protestant German princes, in support of his quest. The papacy
often wished to aid François, but given Charles’s immense influence in Italy
it was frequently unable to do so. From that point of view the Protestant princes
were much stauncher, if more demanding, allies, and turning Protestant could
have cemented François’s relationship with them. However, despite François’s fre-
quent frustration with papal policies, he lacked some of the incentives Henry VIII
had to break with Rome: he had no pressing personal issues with the pope, and
he already appointed French bishops and abbots as a result of the Concor-
dat of Bologna ð1516Þ. Heretics were tried in the parlements—that is, in royal
courts, not ecclesiastical ones. He already had nearly as much control over the
French Church as he would have gained by enacting a magisterial Reforma-
tion, and the Parlement of Paris was prepared to allow him to legislate in ex-
traordinary fashion—above and beyond the law—if he used his powers to en-
force orthodoxy.14
In the end, François made the decision to remain a Catholic, but for many
years he tried to fudge his position and have it both ways, attempting to maintain
his relationships with the German Protestant princes as well as with Rome. It is
reasonable to conclude that at least one of the reasons why François promoted
the study of biblical languages and acceded to Marguerite’s requests to pro-
tect evangelicals facing persecution from the royal courts was that he wished to
placate, or at least to avoid antagonizing, his German Protestant allies. But it was
hard to temporize forever: the space for compromise was vanishing as Europe’s
Protestants and Catholics became increasingly frustrated with one another. In the
1530s, French Protestants became more interested in radical Zwinglian theolog-
ical ideas, distancing themselves from Marguerite’s position. It became clear that
François was unwilling to break with Rome, and Marguerite lost influence with
him. She also became less popular with her erstwhile evangelical supporters. In
the 1520s, Marguerite was central to French theological debates, but by the late
1530s she was left alone in the center as battle lines began to form on either side.
Calvin, safe in Geneva, began to criticize her and members of her network for
being “Nicodemites” ðhypocritesÞ ð2:554Þ. To give just one example, Calvin could
not understand how Gérard Roussel, who had fled France in 1525 after the
Parlement of Paris condemned him for heresy, could accept positions that Mar-
guerite procured for himwithin the Church, first as her almoner and then, in 1536,
as Bishop of Oloron. ðOloron was located in Béarn, Marguerite’s lands near the
Spanish border.Þ At the same time, Roussel’s strenuous reform efforts met with
14 Tyler Lange, The First French Reformation: Church Reform and the Origins of the
Old Regime ðCambridge, 2014Þ.
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severe criticism from local Catholics ð2:520–50Þ. Furthermore, Marguerite be-
came isolated at least in part because she was simultaneously a Protestant and
an establishment figure. By the time the Wars of Religion broke out, only Catho-
lics could be royalists; Protestants were rebels.
It is hard not to conclude from Reid’s account that political considerations
deeply influenced religious decisions, at least at the French court. This does not
mean that theology was unimportant or uninteresting, but in this exalted social
sphere political concerns encouraged everyone to have a certain degree of
theological moderation and flexibility. King François I was a sincere, if broad-
minded, Catholic, but his broad-mindedness was also to some extent tactical.
Similarly, although Reid plausibly argues that Marguerite’s position was consis-
tent, that does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that it was entirely based
on principle. After all, it is convenient for a queen to desire a magisterial Refor-
mation. It also permitted her to push her religious views at court without forc-
ing her to go into exile when it became clear that François would not pursue
her preferred religious policies. Marguerite’s decision to go largely silent is par-
ticularly striking given her passion for theology. She never came close to being a
martyr. Even Henri II ðr. 1547–59Þ, who on the whole followed a more anti-
Protestant line than his father, was not averse to using religion for political pur-
poses. He too allied with German Protestants, and in 1551, in the midst of a
bitter dispute with the pope, briefly considered creating an independent French
Church. Such threats eventually brought the pope to heel, and Henri II called
off his threat.15 As the head of one of Europe’s most powerful states, Henri was
able to get the pope’s attention much more readily than the rulers of minor Ger-
man principalities and hence had a much greater incentive than they did to stay
within the Catholic fold.
III. From Evangelical Movement to Protestant Church
In recent years there has been a flood of books focusing on Calvin, no doubt
in part because 2009 marked 500 years since his birth.16 One of the things that
makes Calvin remarkable is that he was so influential in so many spheres: he
was the supreme theological writer, preacher, and institution builder for the
international Reformed movement. Probably the most important book published
to coincide with this anniversary was Bruce Gordon’s biography, intended for
a nonspecialized audience. It is the best available biography of Calvin in English.
15 For Henri II’s quarrel with Pope Julius III, see Lucien Romier, Les origines politiques
des guerres de religion, 2 vols. ðParis, 1913–14Þ, 1:220–313, esp. 257–59.
16 In May of that year, there were two back-to-back conferences in Geneva to com-
memorate the event. The plenary papers from the second, organized by the Université
de Genève, can be found in Irena Backus and Philip Benedict, Calvin and His Influence,
1509–2009 ðOxford, 2011Þ.
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Writing a biography of Calvin should terrify any sane scholar. The published
primary sources are immense, and the secondary literature is even larger. Further,
there is a mass of unpublished primary sources—hundreds of transcribed ser-
mons, for a start—much of it in appalling handwriting.17 Despite the immense
mass of material, in print Calvin tended, like many of his contemporaries, to be
personally reticent: finding key, revealing lines is extremely difficult. A final quan-
dary when writing on Calvin for a modern lay audience is that insofar as he is still
remembered today, he generates passionate, divergent opinions. Some think they
know just how awful he was although they have never read a line of his work.
Others treat him as the font of theological Truth. Gordon has produced a smoothly
written, balanced biography that, despite some wobbles ðhe occasionally con-
tradicts himself Þ, avoids hagiography or demonizing. I finished it unsure as to
whether Gordon had conveyed the visceral essence of the man, but he has clearly
read deeply in the classic printed sources ðalthough he cites no manuscriptsÞ, and
the result is generally impressive.
Gordon’s account makes clear that Calvin was immersed in evangelical circles
long before he converted in any precise sense to Protestantism. Unfortunately,
Calvin’s early life is poorly documented, and his own descriptions are short,
vague, and conflicting, so there is little evidence of the process of spiritual de-
velopment that led to his becoming a Protestant. Still, as Gordon makes clear,
one of Calvin’s first teachers in Paris, Maturin Cordier, was a Protestant. ðCalvin
learned his excellent Latin from him.Þ Gordon notes that in Calvin’s letter to
Cardinal Sadoleto ð1539Þ “there is no Road to Damascus moment” but that in
another account from 1557 Calvin does describe himself as having a “sudden
conversion.” He insists that “the two accounts are not antithetical . . . but rather
two different ways of expressing the same reality” ð34Þ. To me that formulation
is unnecessarily confusing. It does not appear that any unusual crisis in Calvin’s
life led to his conversion; it was simply part of his maturation. Calvin may have
suddenly realized that he could no longer consider himself a member of the same
church as the pope, but his theological views never shifted radically. One telling
sign is that there is no evidence that Calvin was ever officially ordained; he grad-
ually slid into a preaching and teaching role ð71Þ. This is consistent with a
gradual style of conversion that has been identified by contemporary psychol-
ogists18 and helps to explain why Calvin was more a theological conciliator than
17 Several hundred sermons were inadvertently thrown out in the late nineteenth
century, but the rest are now being published by Librairie Droz, of Geneva. Calvin College
has several projects that aid scholarship on Calvin: an online bibliography, the Calvinism
Resources Database ðhttp://www.calvin.edu/library/database/card/Þ, and two e-collections
that include much of his writing: the Christian Classics Ethereal Library ðhttp://www.ccel
.org/Þ and the Post-Reformation Digital Library ðhttp://www.prdl.org/Þ.
18 Bernard Spilka et al., The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach ðNew
York, 2003Þ, 348–51.
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a radical, divisive innovator. Calvin’s Institutes, his first published theological
work, was important because it suggested a way to reunify the Protestant world,
which was riven with disputes. It created a movement for which Calvin then
proceeded to create institutions.
Calvin was a minor figure prior to the publication of the Institutes. Its limpid
summary of Reformed doctrine made his name. His only previous work, a com-
mentary on Seneca’s De clementia ð1532Þ, was known to only a few scholars. He
also had some prominent friends in the scholarly world, most notably Nicolas
Cop, who became Rector of the University of Paris in 1533. It is likely, although
not absolutely certain, that Calvin wrote Cop’s inaugural address, which was full
of Protestant rhetoric. After the resulting scandal, Cop fled to Basel ð38Þ, where,
after various detours, Calvin went too, and where he finished the first edition
of the Institutes. It was an astonishing debut—in essence a catechism, a sum-
mary of Protestant doctrine. As Gordon correctly points out, in the Institutes
Calvin boldly entered the dispute between Luther and Zwingli on the definition
and meaning of the Eucharist ðwhich some Protestant denominations call Com-
munion or the Lord’s SupperÞ, the most important theological question then fac-
ing the international Protestant movement. In doing so “he subtly navigate½d
through the treacherous waters of Reformation thought to present a distinctive
position that was more than mere compromise” ð60–61Þ. The question dividing
the Protestant world centered on the meaning of the word “is”—shades of the
Clinton era!When Jesus said, “This is my body,” did he mean that ðin some senseÞ
the bread became his body, as Luther insisted, or that it symbolized his body,
which was Zwingli’s view? Are the bread and the body the same or different?
Calvin argued that, like a pair of wheels attached by an axle, the bread and the
body should be understood as separate but firmly linked—the power of the
symbol is such that it automatically calls forth the thing it signifies. This theo-
logical compromise was particularly attractive because it offered a theological
reason—not just political expediency—to persuade other Protestants to unite
behind Calvin’s views. Calvin’s Eucharistic theology, like Farel’s Eucharistic
prayers, was important because the Eucharist defined Christian communities:
it determined their membership and also the relationship between the celebrant
and the faithful.
The success of the Institutes led to a brief period of travel for Calvin, which
ended when he came to Geneva at Farel’s urging in 1536. Except for three years
in Strasbourg ð1538–41Þ he stayed there the rest of his life. After he had settled
in Geneva, it became apparent that his ability as a theologian was only exceeded
by his talent for organization. His presence in Geneva—and the city’s conve-
nience for French refugees, because of its language and its location near the
border—led to a dramatic increase in the city’s population and turned it into the
center of the Reformed movement, which grew dramatically in France begin-
ning in the mid-1550s. Calvin created the Genevan Academy, whose graduates
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staffed many of France’s nascent Protestant churches, and his immense cor-
respondence also knit together the movement.19 ðThis correspondence is prob-
ably Gordon’s single most important source.Þ The gibe that in Geneva Calvin
created a new Rome is apt.
Protestant growth was originally slow, but in the later 1550s conversions in-
creased dramatically, especially among townspeople, in tandem with Henri II’s
fumbling policies and harsh tax increases during poor economic times. Gordon
puts too much emphasis on the early conversion of nobles ð306Þ: some such
conversions ðespecially of noblewomen such as MargueriteÞ were useful to the
movement, but nobles really became prominent in the movement beginning
in the 1560s during the Wars of Religion. Noblemen were also apt to resist
Calvin’s authority, as for example in 1560 when a group of noblemen attempted
to seize the king to force a pro-Protestant change in policy—an event known as
the conspiracy of Amboise ð311Þ. Calvin opposed the conspiracy, which failed
spectacularly.
Where I would most have liked more insight from this biography would
have been in the discussion of Calvin’s magnetic effect on his contemporaries.
Negative stereotypes of Calvin frequently portray him as a parody of a Scots
Presbyterian preacher circa 1890—icy, taciturn, moralistic. Gordon does a nice
job of dispelling some of these negative impressions of Calvin, pointing out,
for instance, that Calvin enjoyed wine ðespeciallyÞ, food, and conversation with
friends ð147Þ. In fact, Calvin insisted on the importance of expressing emo-
tion, and he denounced Stoicism because “the faithful are not logs of wood, un-
touched by grief, unafraid of danger, unhurt by poverty, untroubled by perse-
cution.” Although Calvin shared the age’s suspicious attitudes toward women, he
also talked about the “extremely tender love that a youth feels for a maiden in the
flower of her age” and concluded that “he who shall be induced to choose a wife
because of the elegance of her shape will not necessarily sin.”20 He also enjoyed
various games, including quoits, and played boules with John Knox.21 In an in-
terview, Gordon emphasizes Calvin’s “flexibility”22—a quality he touches on in
the book as well, writing that Calvin “wanted the Protestant world to speak with
one voice and was perfectly willing to tolerate a degree of theological flexibility
to achieve this” ð248Þ.
Passionate rather than icy, warm rather than mild-mannered, Calvin was be-
loved but no Mr. Rogers. Gordon calls the reformer “ruthless, and an outstanding
19 It would be interesting to see an analysis of the reformers’ relative status using their
letters, along the lines of Giora Sternberg’s “Epistolary Ceremonial: Corresponding Status
at the Time of Louis XIV,” Past and Present 204 ð2009Þ: 33–88.
20 Both quotations are cited in William J. Bouswsma, John Calvin: A Sixteenth Cen-
tury Portrait ðOxford, 1988Þ, 137.
21 John T. McNeill, The History and Character of Calvinism ðOxford, 1954Þ, 233.
22 See http://www.yale.edu/divinity/notes/110207/gordon.shtml.
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hater” ðviiÞ. This was an unbuttoned age: as Febvre expressed it, somewhat con-
descendingly, “They were simple people who gave in to their feelings. We re-
press ours.”23 Calvin was undoubtedly intimidating—how could someone
whose works fill fifty-nine closely printed volumes not be?—but perhaps the
keynote of his character was intensity. As Gordon remarks, it was Calvin’s “abil-
ity to express in words the emotional responses of the Christian to the Word of
God that made him the most powerful of commentators” ð286Þ. He was also able
to evoke passionate loyalty, and in his sermons there are occasional glimpses
of his deep attentiveness and concern for his students and his flock. As with
Farel, Calvin offered a high-cost, high-reward path of Christian spirituality.
Calvin directed much of his energy to training ministers at the Genevan Acad-
emy; they would then be sent to evangelize the cities and towns of France.
Particularly in the later 1550s and early 1560s his efforts were rewarded with
astonishing success, especially in the south of the kingdom. But there were
also many French towns that were resistant to the Protestant message, and ex-
plaining why has been a major focus of scholarly debate. Thierry Amalou’s
study of Senlis, Une concorde urbaine, addresses this important question, aided
by the fortuitous survival of particularly good records, including extensive theo-
logical writings by the town’s Catholic leadership.
The French monarchy’s generally lenient policies toward Senlis were gov-
erned by strategic considerations and helped to slow the growth of Protestant-
ism there. Senlis is only thirty miles north-northeast of Paris and close to the
most plausible invasion route from the north. The crown always worried that
the capital could be threatened or captured by hostile forces from this direc-
tion because Paris was no more than an easy few days’ march from the fron-
tier. Thus, on the one hand, Senlis’s municipal independence was distinctly con-
stricted, and the crown watched carefully to make sure that its château and
defenses were in good repair. On the other hand, its taxes were kept deliberately
low to discourage rebellion. Senlis’s constitution completely excluded artisans
from power ð41Þ, but ðlike many other French towns and citiesÞ almost all of its
early Protestants came from the artisanate ð63Þ. The movement grew slowly be-
cause it lacked elite patronage—there was no local Marguerite de Navarre. Still,
by 1562 the movement had managed to spread farther up the social scale to in-
clude members of the political, judicial, and economic elite ð136Þ, although by
no means the majority. Even the elite converts tended to be outsiders. One of
the principal Calvinists in Senlis, Jean Greffin, had a persistently antagonistic,
23 Lucien Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of
Rabelais, trans. Beatrice Gottlieb ðCambridge, MA, 1982Þ, 100. Zuidema and Van Raalte
also mention a nice example of this, recounting ð10 and fn.Þ the epithets Erasmus and
Farel used about each other. Farel called Erasmus “Balaam,” after the celebrated prophet
in Numbers whose ass could see an angel before he could and who proclaimed the Truth
despite himself. More simply and less elegantly, Erasmus called Farel “Phallicus.”
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oppositional relationship with the town’s notables despite the fact that he held
an important office ð150–52Þ. The Protestant movement in Senlis remained on
the defensive: we know about the new elite recruits because they were arrested,
and several were eventually executed.
Senlis was never in real danger of becoming a Calvinist city. For example,
finances were one of the classic areas of conflict between town officials and the
church, but this rule did not apply in Senlis. The inhabitants received some help
from the church, could expect little more, and in any case were not subject to
heavy royal demands. In 1553 the crown endorsed a local proposal that Senlis’s
clergy pay one-third of the cost of maintaining the city’s fortifications ð33Þ.
Furthermore, the bishopric, although one of the oldest in France, was also among
the smallest and poorest of them. With no history of fighting between town and
church officials, it is not surprising that Protestants were few ð77Þ. The Protes-
tants’ cause was also hurt when their preacher, Constantin Bedeau, was forced
to flee to Geneva in 1556 and then, upon his return in 1563, captured along with
others; he was sent to the galleys ð86Þ. His arrest reassured the Catholic leader-
ship. Senlis was firmly under Catholic control ð175Þ, and precisely for that rea-
son there were no massacres there during the Wars of Religion ð342Þ. Amalou
notes that after Senlis’s form of government was revamped in 1564 and lawyers
and officials returned to power, the town’s policies toward Protestants became
less aggressive ð271Þ. In 1577 Senlis rejected the Catholic League, probably
owing to the influence of the Montmorencys, the leading noble family in the
town ð330–38Þ. The Protestant leader Philippe Duplessis-Mornay was even
elected to the Estates General of 1576 from the bailliage of Senlis ð329Þ; ad-
mittedly the electorate of the bailliage included far more people than just
townsmen.
In Senlis, as elsewhere, a central ideological debate between Catholics and
Protestants concerned how to define community. Amalou has the benefit of
excellent documentation, including a manuscript recording the responses of a
clutch of Protestants under interrogation in 1532. The accused heretics admitted
to attending conventicles, and they particularly criticized the clergy and attacked
the principal source of their sacral power, the Eucharist, denying the Real
Presence ð68Þ. Amalou suggests, plausibly, that the Protestants of Senlis read of
such doctrines in an anonymous pamphlet of 1532, probably written by Farel.
Despite this comparatively early beginning, it appears that a proper Protestant
church with a minister and the administration of the sacraments was not set up un-
til comparatively late, in 1562.
The Church, in its struggle to retain the affection of the people, also stressed
community. To fight heresy, the Catholic Church revivified the cult of the town’s
first bishop and patron, St. Rieul, regularly bringing out his reliquary for public
devotion. This rite underlined that Catholicism was the unique, historic religion
of the community of Senlis ð101–7, 248–69Þ. Over the period 1522–84 Church
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officials pursued a policy of “Gallican reformism” ð178Þ: wanton priests were
disciplined ð182Þ, ignorant ones educated ð206Þ. Amalou was also able to con-
sult printed works by local Catholic clergy, and even the interrogation of an im-
portant Senlis clerical figure who attempted to find a middle path between the
two confessions ð118Þ.
The case of Senlis suggests that if Farel came to Protestantism via contempt
for the excessive devotional ritualism of late medieval Catholicism, what really
resonated with his listeners was the attack on the sacral authority of the Catholic
clergy. It is not surprising that outsiders found this rejection of authority partic-
ularly seductive. Of course, for a movement of outsiders to succeed, they had to
accumulate sufficient social, economic, intellectual, and political power. The
French Protestant movement also needed to have breathing space, which is
probably why it was particularly successful in the south of the country, far
from Paris. Even within the south Protestantism tended to do best in the smaller
towns, where there were fewer royal institutions. In Toulouse, for example, civil
war broke out between the the parlement, which stood for King and Faith, against
the town council, which supported the new religion. The judges of the parle-
ment were the richest, most prestigious people in town, and they had the closest
connections to the crown. In the end, God was with the big battalions, and the
Protestants were slaughtered.24
The case of Senlis helps explain why the Catholic Church remained the
religion of the majority of French people; it is less helpful in explaining why the
Wars of Religion broke out, why they lasted so long, and why they had such
dreadful consequences. In the 1550s, Henri II raised taxes throughout the king-
dom to support his unsuccessful foreign policy, and his subjects grew increas-
ingly angry. But in Senlis and elsewhere in the immediate environs of Paris,
royal power remained strong, as did royal patronage. Protestants in Senlis latched
onto the available local discontent, but their message did not resonate with the
majority.25 In the traditionally rebellious Midi, most notably the famous “Protes-
tant crescent” ðreaching from the middle Rhône to the Loire via the valley of the
GaronneÞ, and in Normandy, Protestants became either a majority or something
very close to it.
24 Mark Greengrass, “The Anatomy of a Religious Riot in Toulouse in May 1562,”
Journal of Ecclesiastical History 34 ðJuly 1983Þ: 367–91, and Joan Davies, “Persecution
and Protestantism: Toulouse, 1562–1575,” Historical Journal 22 ð1979Þ: 31–51.
25 Similar conclusions emerge from another recent local study, Olivier Cabayé, Albi
au XVIe siècle: Gens de bien et autres “apparens” ðAlbi, 2008Þ, an impressive reconstruc-
tion of a town’s elite using notarial records. He reports that, as in Senlis and elsewhere, early
converts came from the artisanate ð387–90Þ, and conversion only spread to “second-rate”
elites. He also provides a remarkable graphic ð396Þ showing the close family ties among
Albi’s Protestant families.
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IV. The Wars of Religion
Although Protestantism was initially strongest in the towns, it also appealed
to noblewomen.26 Noblemen adopted the faith more slowly, although by the
1560s many had done so—a fortunate development for the Protestant move-
ment, since noblemen provided crucial military leadership when civil war broke
out in 1562. Such exalted people, while they could be moved by ideology,
commonly had to consider the political implications of their religious choices.
The Guises have traditionally been seen as more consistently and zealously
Catholic than any other noble family in sixteenth-century France. Stuart Carroll,
however, in his Martyrs and Murderers: The Guise and the Making of Europe
ðwinner of the J. Russell Major PrizeÞ, goes so far as to question even the
Guises’ commitment to Catholicism when it went against their political inter-
ests. Although I have emphasized above that leading figures like Marguerite de
Navarre and François I chose their religious policies consistent with their political
interests, Carroll goes even farther than I would. He sets the stage for his
argument by noting that at the outbreak of the Wars of Religion, leaders had
unusual freedom: “In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of civil war in
1562, politics was in a state of flux and uncertainty” ð144Þ. Certainly Charles de
Guise, Cardinal of Lorraine, although demonized in some Protestant accounts, has
long been known for relatively moderate policies.27 As the cardinal wrote to the
Bishop of Verdun in 1558, “you must look on it ½heresy in the gentlest and most
prudent way that you can, until we are out of the troubles and wars that occupy us,
when we will have the means to deal with it carefully and more according to its
merits” ð94Þ. On August 24, 1561, the cardinal actually believed he had reached
agreement with Calvin’s chief lieutenant, Theodore de Bèze, on the significance
of the Eucharist ð150Þ. Although that agreement fell apart, many observers felt
that when the cardinal expounded his own position, on September 16, he came
close to Lutheranism, using language derived from the Augsburg Confession.28
If the cardinal’s moderation has long been known, historians have tradition-
ally concluded that his brother, François, Duke of Guise, held more sectarian
views. But Carroll points out a number of holes in this interpretation. He sees
the two brothers as working in tandem: “There is good reason to believe that
François, Duke of Guise, too, was behind his brother’s efforts to find a mid-
dle way in the summer and autumn of 1561” ð144Þ. In a letter to the Duke of
26 Nancy L Roelker, “The Appeal of Calvinism to French Noblewomen in the Six-
teenth Century,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 2, no. 4 ð1972Þ: 391–418, and “The
Role of Noblewomen in the French Reformation,” Archiv Für Reformationsgeschichte
63 ð1972Þ: 168–95.
27 H. Outram Evennett, The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent ðCambridge,
1930Þ.
28 Donald Nugent, Ecumenism in the Age of the Reformation: The Colloquy of Poissy
ðCambridge,MA, 1974Þ, esp. 210–18.
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Württemberg, the Duke of Guise condemned the “blindness and idolatry” of the
Catholic Church ð146Þ. Guise did not support religious toleration—“an idea ab-
horrent to the vast majority of Europeans” ð147Þ, according to Carroll—but
rather advocated a compromise that would allow all French people to come
together again as one church. Although religious toleration may have been un-
desirable, people in the sixteenth century could consider it—there were worse al-
ternatives. Catherine de’Medici and her chancellor Michel de l’Hospital both
felt that toleration was better than pointless bloodshed. Similarly, Nîmes’s
cahier de doléances ðlist of grievancesÞ prepared for the Estates General meet-
ing at Pontoise in 1561 argued that “those who believe they cannot take part in
the ceremonies of the Roman Church should be given means to be instructed
and taught in the Word of God, for fear lest they fall into atheism.”29 The cahier’s
authors clearly expected France’s leaders to fear atheism more than heresy. As
Carroll notes, even the Guises argued at times that civil war was much worse
than toleration.
Carroll stresses Guise family solidarity rather than religious zeal as key to their
political strategy, but he downplays occasions when the Guises were at least
happy to let it appear that they were Catholic champions. It is true that the Duke’s
own wife, Anne d’Este, was a Protestant ð61Þ. Similarly, Carroll emphasizes that
when Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots and daughter of Marie de Guise, married
François, King Henri II’s heir, about one-third of the Guises’ guests at the head
table were Protestants, or soon to become so. By contrast, the Montmorencys,
the Guises’main rivals at court, were banned ð84Þ. Anne, Duke of Montmorency
and Constable of France, was a zealous Catholic, although his sister and neph-
ews were Protestants. When the Duke of Guise reconciled with the consta-
ble, in April 1561, he promptly broke off the betrothal of his daughter with the
Protestant Duke of Longueville ð144Þ. He thus acted primarily to benefit his
family, and his behavior toward Protestants varied depending on whether or not
he was getting along with the more rigidly Catholic Montmorencys. The tradi-
tional view that the Guise family were fervent Catholics is underpinned by the
notion that they were in large part responsible for two of the most important
massacres during the Wars of Religion: the Massacre of Wassy and the Saint
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. Consistent with his emphasis on the Guises’
political canniness rather than religious zeal, Carroll minimizes their independent
role in both massacres.
Historians have usually seen the massacre at Wassy ð1562Þ, where the Duke
of Guise’s men slaughtered dozens of men, women, and children during a church
service, as the opening salvo of the Wars of Religion. But Carroll argues that to
the degree Guise was involved, his motives were not primarily religious. He
wished to repress heresy, but he was not a zealot. In Carroll’s account, the Duke
29 Tulchin, That Men Would Praise the Lord, 108.
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of Guise was angered by the temerity of his vassals and certainly wished to
prevent Protestant worship if he could, but Carroll quotes without contradiction
the duke’s statement that he “despised cruelty and ½preferred to leave the sword
and arms to the magistrate” ð19Þ. There is really no reason for us to believe the
duke’s self-exculpation. Moreover, Carroll does not mention that Catholics saw
him as their champion: when the duke arrived in Paris days after the massacre,
he was acclaimed as a hero.30 And, as Carroll does admit, Protestants hated the
duke after Wassy: he was assassinated in 1563. In short, there is good evidence
that Guise repeatedly took an ultra-Catholic stance to further his family’s position.
Nor does Carroll view Duke François’s successor, his son Henri, Duke of
Guise, as a zealous Catholic, comparing him to Henri of Navarre, the future King
Henri IV: “To them religion was subordinate to politics: neither man was espe-
cially devout; there was something of the libertine about both” ð222Þ. Carroll
endorses the report of the great historian Jacques-Auguste de Thou, who wrote
that Montaigne had told him Guise had admitted that, like Navarre, he only
used religion as a device to get the members of his party to follow him and that
his personal theology was Lutheran ð255Þ. ðDe Thou was a politique—that is,
a moderate, royalist Catholic who believed that national unity required some
concessions to the Protestant movement.Þ In support of his view that Guise had
a limited taste for religious extremism, Carroll argues that Guise played little
role in initiating the events surrounding the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Mas-
sacre in Paris. In this Carroll’s interpretation agrees with several other recent
accounts.31
There were many links between the Duke of Guise and the Saint Bartholo-
mew’s Day Massacre, which shocked Europe in part because it took place at a
time when it seemed that religious tensions were waning. Only days earlier in
Paris a great ceremony of reconciliation had been enacted: on August 18, 1572,
Marguerite de Valois, sister of King Charles IX ðr. 1560–74Þ, married the Prot-
estant leader Henri de Navarre ðlater Henri IV of FranceÞ. However, four days
later, another leading French Protestant leader, the Admiral de Coligny, was shot.
Coligny and Guise were old enemies. Carroll also shows that there were many
ties between the admiral’s attacker, Charles de Louviers, seigneur of Maurevert,
and his confederates and the Guise family. Maurevert had been a page to Guise’s
father François, the previous duke. Maurevert fired from the house of Canon Pierre
de Pilles de Villemur, Guise’s former tutor. After the assassination, Maurevert
fled to the château of Chailly, which belonged to Jean de la Boissière, a master
of Duke François’s household and one of Duke Henri’s chief advisors. A year
30 Arlette Jouanna, Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion ðParis, 1998Þ, 110
31 Including, most recently, Jouanna, The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. Jouan-
na’s excellent notes will guide interested readers to the literature on this controversial
topic. I have reviewed Jouanna’s book in H-France Forum 8 ðSummer 2013Þ: 57–61
ðhttp://www.h-france.net/forum/h-franceforumvol8.htmlÞ.
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and a day after Coligny’s death, Duke Henri agreed to pay de Louviers an annual
pension of 2,000 livres, and the canon also received significant advancement
in the aftermath of the massacre ð208–12Þ. Since many members of Guise’s en-
tourage also had quarrels with Coligny, Carroll argues that “ultimate responsi-
bility” cannot be determined: “½Guise’s retinue was full of retainers who had
a motive, thought the risks acceptable, and were willing to do the dirty work
themselves. No orders were necessary” ð212Þ.
The attack reopened the confessional divide. Angry Protestants immediately
demanded that the King arrest, try, and execute Guise, believing him responsible
for the attempted murder. But the king and his councillors, as good Catholics,
were unwilling to act so dramatically in the Protestant cause. In any case they
would have found it extremely difficult to arrest France’s leading Catholic cham-
pion, although they believed him guilty.32 Instead, as a later memoir put it, “it
was better to win a battle in Paris, where all the leaders were, than to risk it in
the field and fall into a dangerous and uncertain war.”33 On August 23 the royal
council ordered the execution of Coligny and other leading Protestants ðexcept-
ing Henri de NavarreÞ. The council sent Guise himself to command a detach-
ment of his men who killed Coligny on August 24. Thus he was the council’s
agent and not in charge himself. However, Guise shouted to his men as they
departed the Admiral’s house after the murder, “Let us go to the others, for the
king commands it. . . . The king commands it; it is his will; it is his express
commandment” ð215Þ. Carroll, adopting an interpretation of Barbara Diefen-
dorf’s, suggests that with this remark Guise “inadvertently” set off the third
phase of the events that day, the large-scale massacre.34 In my view, it is more
likely that the Paris militia launched its attack immediately afterward because
Guise and the militia leaders had arranged it in advance. This was a uniquely
tempting opportunity to wipe out the Protestant leadership gathered in the city
for the wedding—and at the same time to destroy his long-standing personal
enemy, Coligny.
Carroll’s wonderfully lively account is thus not just a great read, but it also
advances a very pointed thesis: while the Montmorencys may have been moti-
vated by religion, political considerations were far more important to understand-
ing the actions of the Guises in the Wars of Religion. Although I disagree with
Carroll on the issue of Guise’s role in the massacre, it is certain that this is a matter
that will never be proved either way. I raise the issue here only to explain the
interpretative stakes behind the two hypotheses. If, like Carroll, you do not
believe that Guise was motivated by a deep hatred of heresy, then it becomes
32 Jouanna, Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 90.
33 Cited in R. J. Knecht, The French Wars of Religion, 1559–1598, 3rd ed. ðHarlow,
2010Þ, 49.
34 Barbara B. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-
Century Paris ðOxford, 1991Þ, 99.
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less likely, although not impossible, that Guise would try to unleash a wholesale
massacre of Protestants. It would make more sense to attack Protestant leaders
only, as in the initial phases of the Saint Bartholomew’s DayMassacre, rather than
to extend the killing to women and children. Carroll rightly points out that Duke
Henri hid a number of noble Huguenots ð217–18Þ, but that ðto mymindÞ does not
prove that he was indifferent to religion; it proves only that his respect for noble
blood sometimes trumped his distaste for heresy. Carroll does note that at least
one Protestant family hastily reclaimed their daughter after she had sheltered
at the Hôtel de Guise for a week when they learned that the Guise family planned
to rebaptize her and her siblings ð217Þ. In short, here I would impute somewhat
more religious zeal than Carroll ðor DiefendorfÞ does to Guise’s actions—or, at
least, I would suggest that if Guise was motivated in part by self-interest, he may
have concluded that he was most likely to increase his power by standing at
the head of the Catholic party. It seems to me that Guise felt scorn and hatred
for heretics—and frustration that they would not disappear. He had to crush the
Protestants to demonstrate his leadership. That made him prepared to attempt a
drastic solution to the Protestant problem.
Guise was not unique in his propensity for drastic solutions. Historians have
long considered the French Wars of Religion to be a prime example of one of the
most noteworthy features of early modern Europe, namely, the poor negotiat-
ing skills of the leaders of early modern states, which made it hard for them to
compromise and make peace with each other. As a result, Europe endured end-
less wars ðthe Thirty Years’War, the Eighty Years’WarÞ, and one might conclude
that historians should seek an explanation for this phenomenon in structural
features of early modern European societies and state institutions. While there
is much truth to this, it is also true that there were periods after the outbreak of
civil war in 1562 but before the Edict of Nantes in 1598 when the French Wars
of Religion might have ended. Mark Greengrass’s Governing Passions: Peace
and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576–1585 is a well-written and marvel-
ously well-researched study of one such period. The wars had severely weakened
the nation’s institutions ð4Þ, and one of the major reasons to hope for peace was
that it would provide King Henri III ðr. 1574–89Þ an opportunity for political re-
form. This was a unique opportunity because there was widespread agreement
that basic reforms were needed. Greengrass focuses on what reforms were at-
tempted, what degree of success was achieved, and why. Although his emphasis
on reform in this period is not entirely new,35 Greengrass enormously enriches
our knowledge. He concludes that, despite the destructiveness of the wars, the
weakness of the state, differing reform agendas, and continuing confessional
animosity, the crown nonetheless successfully implemented a number of
35 See Jouanna, Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion, “L’œuvre reforma-
trice,” 279–84.
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reforms. The state’s institutional apparatus was made relevant again: royal
legislation “provided a framework in which royal justice was the purveyor of
peace” ð372Þ.At theendof the Wars of Religion, the French crown was able to
resuscitate itself because most subjects recognized its crucial role in providing
peace.
If the reform program helped underpin the growth of the absolute monarchy,
its failures help explain 1789. The sixteenth-century reform program attacked
inflation ð373Þ and the deficiencies in the law via the 1579 Ordinances of Blois,
“the largest single legislative enterprise of the sixteenth-century French state”
ð265Þ. The crown began to implement financial reforms, and it also solemnly
promised to eliminate the sale of offices by buying out the officeholders, but
these redemptions did not occur because reform was painfully slow and in the
meantime unforeseeable circumstances led to the renewed outbreak of war.
Although most observers saw venality as the principal obstacle to putting the
French monarchy on a sounder footing, no more serious attempt to eliminate
venality was ever undertaken.
Greengrass’s book begins in the mid-1570s because the stalemate in the
aftermath of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre compelled the parties to
rethink their strategies. In the early years of the wars, the Catholics were usually
responsible for the breakdown of peace. The crown, under the influence of
Catherine de’Medici, was generally Catholic but prepared to allow Protestant
worship. Other Catholics were less tolerant: Catholics in Sens ðYonneÞ reacted to
measures like the liberal Edict of January of 1561 by massacring Protestants.
If any good can be said to have come of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre
of 1572, it is that in its aftermath—particularly after the failure of the siege of
La Rochelle in 1573 ð15Þ—even many militant Catholics concluded that the
Protestant movement could not be eliminated militarily. Some, including the
important Catholic military leader and memoirist Blaise de Monluc, were even
willing to admit it.36 Peace became possible. Greengrass’s account, logically, be-
gins immediately after the failed siege, since King Henri III’s younger brother,
the Duke of Anjou, who commanded the royal forces, reacted to the defeat by
commissioning a report on how to improve the state to prevent the recurrence
of such disastrous events. The final document was quite wide-ranging, includ-
ing sections on the reform of the Church, financial reform, the nobility, and the
currency, as well as the judiciary and purely military issues ð20–28Þ.
Another reason why the Wars of Religion helped cause 1789 was that they
led to the weakening of the Estates General. As a result of the repeated failure
of the Estates, the crown came to fear them even though it also viewed them as
36 Solange Deyon, “Blaise de Monluc, la guerre, la paix,” Bulletin de la société de
l’histoire du protestantisme français 150, no. 2 ð2004Þ: 245–56, cited in Penny Roberts,
Peace and Authority During the French Religious Wars, c. 1560–1600 ðBasingstoke,
2013Þ, 122.
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ineffectual, and it stopped calling them after 1614. Greengrass devotes a long
chapter ð66–122Þ to the 1576 meeting of the Estates, whose deliberations pro-
vide much evidence about French ideas of reform at the time and whose fail-
ure led to a brief renewal of war. The crown had a long-standing interest in
developing the Estates, since it believed that functioning Estates improved the
health of the body politic ð67Þ and because it hoped that the Estates would au-
thorize increased taxation. The Protestant movement, born in part in resistance
to what it saw as oppressive monarchical policies, was committed to the Estates
from the beginnings of its existence as an organized institution in the early 1560s.
Given these ideological preconceptions it is not surprising that Protestants pro-
posed, and the crown agreed, to the calling of the Estates General as part of
the Peace of Monsieur in 1576, enacted into law by the Edict of Beaulieu.37
Beaulieu granted Protestants freedom to establish churches anywhere in the
kingdom, with the exception of the area immediately around Paris. This horri-
fied the large group of Catholics who were prepared to accept the continued
existence but not the potential expansion of the Protestant church. Signs of
danger appeared almost immediately when Catholics in and around Péronne
ðSommeÞ began to organize to prevent the crown from handing the town over to
the Protestant leader, Henri, Prince de Condé, as the Peace of Monsieur required.
These Catholic organizations eventually coalesced into the Catholic League;
although the exact process is rather mysterious ð72–74Þ, the electioneering prior
to the 1576 Estates General meeting was decisive in organizing the Catholic
party ð75–81Þ. But the key point is that both the crown and the Protestants
allowed their ideals to triumph over their interests—sanity should have pre-
vented them from calling the Estates unless they were certain that they could
control them. Permitting the Estates General to debate the issues only reopened
questions that had already been decided in the Protestants’ favor.
Given France’s sharp religious divisions, it is not surprising that the Estates
General did not coalesce into a working body that would permit the crown and
the localities to agree decisively on fiscal and political issues. Worse, even the
large Catholic majority in the Estates could not agree on a common policy. The
result was a fiasco. When hardline Catholics were confronted with actually hav-
ing to make policy, they tended to pull back from the painful and expensive
consequences of their demands. As an example, Greengrass cites the case of the
discussions surrounding the submission of the Montdidier ðSommeÞ cahier de
doléances, for which very good records survive. The original draft included a
provision demanding that the king enforce Catholicism on the country by requir-
ing all Protestants to convert or go into exile—a stock clause that was circulated
via the leagues to other Catholic associations. This draconian anti-Protestant
37 Nicola M. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition ðNew Haven, CT,
1980Þ, prints the text of the edict on 361–62.
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provision was amended to allow all “paisibles” ðpeacefulÞ Protestants to re-
main ð79Þ. At the actual meeting of the Estates, the overwhelmingly Catholic
majority refused to call for the war to be renewed or to approve the taxes
necessary to pay for it, and therefore its militancy was merely rhetorical. Even
when debating judicial reform, a less fraught subject, the deputies “wanted an
incompatibility; a judicial system that was sophisticated, locally delivered, pro-
fessional, and equitable, but also cheap and quick” ð269Þ.
The meeting of the Estates was not a total failure—the crown used the ca-
hiers of the session as a basis for the Ordinance of Blois—but the session helped
discredit the institution in the eyes of two major supporters: the Protestant move-
ment and, more important, the crown. The slowness of the process was one rea-
son why in 1583 the crown convened an Assembly of Notables. In two months,
the assembly adopted as many articles as the royal council had ðon the basis of
the cahiers of the EstatesÞ in two years ð362Þ. The inefficiency of the 1576 Es-
tates helped destroy the institution of the Estates General since it encouraged
the French crown to develop other methods to govern the nation and raise the
revenue necessary to defend it.
The failure of the Estates did aid the cause of peace, however, since it helped
Catholics realize that they did not wish to pay the price for the policies that
might eliminate Protestantism from the kingdom. If Beaulieu could not stand,
they could accept something that constrained but did not eliminate Protestant-
ism. Further negotiations resulted in a new peace agreement, and Henri III quite
rightly insisted that the provisions of the Edict of Poitiers, signed in 1577, were
“much more honorable and to the advantage of the Catholics than those of the
last edict” ð134Þ. In particular, the Poitiers edict limited Protestant worship to
those places where it already existed, plus one town per bailliage and châteaus
where the seigneur was present. Since there were approximately eighty-six
bailliages in France ðso that bailliages on average were only slightly smaller in
size than the modern départementsÞ,38 Protestant congregations were essentially
limited to their current numbers. Still, especially in the Midi, which the crown be-
lieved was “uncouth ½and disobedient” compared to the north ð135Þ, people had
to be persuaded to accept it. Catherine de’Medici therefore went on a progress
through the Midi ð188–226Þ, using her prodigious talents as a negotiator to
pacify the country. It took her over a year: she took her leave of the king on
August 2, 1578, and was not reunited with him until November 9, 1579 ð188
and map 194Þ. Catherine wrote to Henri that “I am confident that this work
remains so perfect, that nothing better will come to them for a long time, nor
likewise a better thing for your service” ð224Þ. Although this was certainly ex-
aggerated, her achievements were considerable.
As peace returned, the crown began to plan more ambitious reforms, most
notably the elimination of venal office. Contemporaries hated the system of pur-
38 Gaston Zeller, Les institutions de la France au XVie siècle ðParis, 1948Þ, 173–74.
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chasing offices, and even the crown admitted that only immediate financial
necessity justified the practice, which was otherwise “to our very great regret”
ð275Þ. Although venality dated to the High Middle Ages it was seen as an
“innovation,” since François I widened the sale of offices on a grand scale to
help finance his wars against the Hapsburgs and Henri II created a new set of
courts, the présidiaux, specifically in order to sell the judgeships. As such—few
things offended the sixteenth-century mind more than innovations—it had to
be eliminated. The crown committed itself in the Ordinance of Blois to buying
back all offices, but, as Greengrass notes, this reform was “dependent on the
fragile internal peace” ð286Þ. Eliminating venality was just one part of restoring
the administrative machine to working order. The crown also sent commis-
sioners on a tour of local inspection ð314–37Þ. The commissioners necessarily
stopped only briefly in any given town, but they encouraged proper accounts,
attacked corruption, and ðas did Catherine’s visitÞ gave local officials a sense
of connection to the crown.
Greengrass argues that Henri’s reform policies were generally well conceived
and well executed, thus helping to rehabilitate a traditionally despised king.39
They nonetheless failed. Greengrass argues that this was not the king’s fault:
unforeseeable circumstances were to blame. In 1584, the death of Henri III’s
brother, the Duke of Anjou, put the whole existence of the Valois dynasty at
stake. One might still criticize Henri III and Catherine’s reform policies—they
were certainly not very imaginative—but it is not clear that novel approaches were
really necessary. Indeed, Henri IV’s widely praised and successful reforms were
also very traditional.
Anjou’s death transformed the political landscape because it made the Prot-
estant leader, Henri of Navarre ðthe future Henri IVÞ, the heir apparent to the
throne, turning political positions upside down. Protestants who had shown
considerable sympathy toward resistance in theory and in practice suddenly
discovered the merits of obedience, now that a Protestant was the heir presump-
tive to the crown. Catholics, contrariwise, suddenly understood the logic of le-
gitimate rebellion against an anointed ruler, since it was obvious to them that
Protestants were constitutionally barred from the French throne.40
The new situation also completely undid the Edict of Poitiers, with its as-
sumption that the settlement protected the Protestants but quarantined them,
preventing them from expanding. Many Catholics were convinced that Henri
of Navarre, on his accession to the French throne, would encourage the spread
39 Michel Pernot, Henri III: Le roi décrié ðParis, 2013Þ, is the most recent of many
biographies. It discusses Henri III’s changing reputation.
40 For overviews of sixteenth-century Calvinist political thought, see Myriam Yardeni,
“French Calvinist Political Thought, 1534–1715,” in International Calvinism, ed. M.
Prestwich ðOxford, 1985Þ, and J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds., The Cambridge
History of Political Thought, 1450–1700 ðCambridge, 1991Þ, 193–218 ðand, for more
discussion on the political thought of the era, 219–328Þ.
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of Protestantism. Instead the final, bitter War of Religion persuaded him to
convert to Catholicism ðin 1593Þ and, once the kingdom was pacified, to
proclaim the Edict of Nantes ð1598Þ, whose provisions were fundamentally
similar to those of the Edict of Poitiers. The interlude Greengrass recounts thus
represents a major turning point, where French history could have proceeded
in quite different directions. Instead, the basic political questions were reopened
and had to be fought through all over again. Henri III’s legacy came to be not
reform and reconstruction, but renewed, even bloodier war, plus the most spec-
tacular political assassinations in all of French history: those of the Duke of Guise
and his brother the Cardinal of Guise in 1588, and Henri III’s own the following
year.
Historians have traditionally argued that the Wars of Religion were a fight to
the death because of the extreme hatred that religious difference engendered. As
Pierre Miquel put it, Catholics and Protestants during the Wars of Religion “did
not have as ½their goal to dominate the adversary, but to destroy it, to reduce it—
as the inquisitors did—to ashes.” 41 But massacres were actually only a common
tactic at the outset of the wars, when Catholics still thought that Protestants were a
small minority.42 The outlines of a settlement were actually quite clear at an early
date, and had Henri de Navarre not fortuitously become heir presumptive in 1584,
the wars might easily have ended in the mid-1570s. Both sides in the wars were
more rational, and more calculating, than historians have traditionally portrayed
them as being.
V. Catholic Renewal
In the end, most French people remained Catholic: they had fewer reasons to
reject royal authority than the Dutch, for example, and the Dutch also had the ad-
vantage of fighting an absent monarch. At the signing of the Edict of Nantes,
between 5 and 10 percent of the population of France were probably Protestants.
Understanding why the Catholic Church had much greater success reconverting
some regions while others remained stubbornly Protestant is the central concern
of Jill Fehleison’s powerful, persuasive Boundaries of Faith.43 Fehleison gives a
compelling analysis of the diocese of Geneva in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, showing the importance of politics and of collective ritu-
als in the conversion process. The choice of the diocese of Geneva is, of course,
41 Pierre Miquel, Les guerres de religion ðParis, 1980Þ, 22.
42 For a table of massacres during the Wars of Religion, see my article “Massacres
during the French Wars of Religion,” supplement, Past and Present 7 ðFebruary 2012Þ:
100–126, a special issue entitled “Ritual and Violence: Natalie Zemon Davis and Early
Modern France,” ed. Graeme Murdock, Penny Roberts, and Andrew Spicer.
43 Readers should know that Jill Fehleison and I were postdocs together at George
Mason University.
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highly symbolic. Not only was Geneva central to the international Reformed
Church ðthe seat of the Catholic diocese was moved to Annecy in Savoy as a re-
sultÞ, but in addition its bishop from 1602 to 1622 was François de Sales, one
of the most important figures of the Catholic Reformation. De Sales was can-
onized in 1665 and declared a Doctor of the Church in 1877. This contest for
the souls of the people of this Alpine region was the epicenter of a titanic strug-
gle between Rome and Geneva for the soul of Europe, the equivalent of the
battle between King Kong and Godzilla.
Beyond its symbolic importance, the diocese serves as a sort of natural ex-
periment to test the importance of political forces in motivating religious con-
version. De Sales, his predecessor Claude Granier, and his younger brother and
successor Jean-François de Sales had little ability to sway the consciences of
residents of the Genevan Republic. More important was the fact that part of the
diocese, the Chablais, was under the rule of the Dukes of Savoy, while the pays
de Gex, west and northwest of Geneva, was acquired by Henri IV from Berne
by the provisions of the Treaty of Lyon of 1601. The French part of the diocese
thus became subject to the Edict of Nantes. The diocese’s French Protestant in-
habitants, although exhorted to convert, were not under nearly as much govern-
mental pressure as its Savoyard Protestants in the Chablais, where no toleration
edict existed. How did the bishops attempt to convert the inhabitants of the two
regions, and what success did they have? Political pressure works, apparently,
since with the help of the Savoyard state de Sales’s efforts were extremely suc-
cessful in the Chablais, but without the support of Henri IV de Sales achieved
very little in the pays de Gex.
After Gex’s annexation, de Sales was hopeful that Henri IV would support
Catholic practice, although he realized that many ecclesiastical properties had
fallen into lay and Protestant hands and that this would complicate reconver-
sion efforts ð106Þ. But the king did little. De Sales even complained that he had
been restricted in his ability to collect money from the Catholics of the Pays
de Gex to repair the churches ð121Þ. Although the Protestants were eventually
forced to return all the churches, they were permitted to retain three-quarters of
the ecclesiastical revenues for a year to subsidize the construction of new ones
ð128Þ. Without land that could be rented out, it was hard to pay clergy a decent
salary. Most of the candidates who did offer to officiate in the region were
mediocre; to de Sales’s distress, many of them lived with common-law wives
ð131Þ. When trying to further the Catholic cause in the pays de Gex, de Sales
also faced trouble from the Duke of Savoy, Charles-Emmanuel I. From the
duke’s point of view, de Sales was his subject and should not visit the territory
of his enemy, the King of France, even for necessary ecclesiastical business
ð118Þ. After a decade, de Sales succeeded in reestablishing Catholic services in
five parishes in the pays de Gex, but the majority of the population remained
Protestant ð123Þ.
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In short, Fehleison argues that there were a number of reasons why the
Catholic Church failed to make much headway in the pays de Gex, but the un-
willingness of French authorities to support the Church’s efforts forcefully
seems by far the most important one. The relative strength of the churches was
not a significant factor: if the Church was weak in the region, that does not
mean that Protestant institutions there were particularly strong. Most people in
Gex were Protestants, but they were not wealthy or powerful. The Protestants
of Gex did not even have enthusiastic support from the rest of the French Re-
formed Church. In 1612, when the Protestant churches of Gex asked the na-
tional Protestant synod to help finance the building of the new churches, their
Burgundian neighbors and coreligionists grumbled that assisting them would de-
prive other poor congregations of needed funds ð129Þ. The Protestants of Gex
used liturgical rites, derived from those of Berne, that were somewhat more
conservative—that is, closer to Catholicism—than those used in France. Their
new French brethren expected them to conform to French practice. They could
no longer use unleavened bread for the Lord’s Supper, and some feast days
would have to go ð112–13Þ. Thus, although the pays de Gex’s Protestants were
a majority, they would have been vulnerable if the Catholic Church could ob-
tain the support of the state.
When Catholicism in the pays de Gex finally did obtain muscular state sup-
port, under Louis XIV, Protestantism’s days were numbered. Louis abolished
the Edict of Nantes there in 1662, declaring that it did not apply because the
pays de Gex had not been part of France at the time the edict was proclaimed
in 1598 ð135Þ. Again, the political context was paramount. As Fehleison con-
cludes, “Prospects of individual conversions seemed to ebb and flow with the
political negotiations of the region” ð57Þ.
The methods de Sales used to convert people in the Chablais are still very
interesting, and they have important implications for our thinking about the
conversion process. Fehleison convincingly gives most of the credit to collec-
tive rituals that brought mass conversions in their wake, rather than seeing the
Church’s successes as a series of individual conversions. This analysis is con-
sistent with her emphasis on the role of politics in motivating conversions. Al-
though in Fehleison’s account political pressure was essential to the reconver-
sion of the Chablais, she suggests that de Sales’s Forty Hours Celebrations were
crucial to triggering conversions. Three of them were held in 1597 and 1598, and
Fehleison describes them as “the culmination of three years of missionary work
½that produced impressive results” ð64Þ. Beyond the elaborate ceremony, for
Fehleison a “key element” in the success of the mission project was the pres-
ence of the duke ð74–75Þ. He arrived in late September 1598, in the company
of Cardinal Alexander de’Medici, the papal legate to France and the future
Pope Leo XI. On October 1, 1598, the men went to the church of St. Hippolyte
in Thonon, where the ceremony was held. It was decorated with tapestries and
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elaborate hangings for the occasion. The cardinal began the proceedings by
offering absolution to those who needed it, beginning with a former Protestant
pastor, Pierre Petit. The ceremony continued with music, a Mass, and a pro-
cession through the streets to the church of St. Augustine, during which the
bishop displayed the Host to the townspeople. The duke and other dignitaries
went bareheaded, bearing candles. The streets were also decorated with didactic
statuary. More preaching and processions by confraternities followed through the
day and night. The next day, the duke received the Sacrament in order to set an
example, which Fehleison calls a “crucial public statement” ð79Þ. Then, along
with de Sales and other ecclesiastics, he led a procession to the crossroads of
rue de la Croix where they planted a crucifix. Along with the others the duke
knelt and kissed the Cross. The sight of their lord’s devotion to their Lord un-
leashed a flood of conversions.
The Forty Hours ceremonies mirrored Protestant mass preaching of the six-
teenth and later centuries, and indeed revival meetings today. They were designed
to collect a crowd and whip it into a frenzy, creating an emergent norm where
key individuals were tapped ahead of time to testify to their faith, making it ap-
pear as though they were the majority even though this may not have been the
case. The ceremony created enormous social pressure to convert, and it appears
to have had dramatic results.44 This is not to deny that many people converted
in both directions without official encouragement, or despite official hostility.
Cases of principled defiance may be more morally admirable and much more
fun to study. But conformism is all too common and cannot be ignored.
François de Sales was also influential in Parisian reform circles, and he ex-
erted a major influence on some of the figures Barbara Diefendorf focuses on in
FromPenitence toCharity: PiousWomenand theCatholic Reformation inFrance,
which won the J. Russell Major Prize. The book beautifully describes a transfor-
mation in French Catholic spirituality, crisply summarized in its title, and the
book also has the merit of great, evocative writing. The tone bears a distinct re-
semblance to H. Outram Evennett’s classic The Spirit of the Counter-Reformation
ð1968Þ, and Diefendorf ’s description of Counter-Reformation piety is quite close
to Evennett’s. Both focus resolutely on the internal debates of the Catholic Church,
and as a result they elide some of the nastier elements of Church policy—such as
the Index of Prohibited Books and the papal medal struck to celebrate the Saint
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. In Diefendorf ’s case, this is an entirely legiti-
mate choice: she is writing about pious Catholic women in the early seventeenth
century. But the same pious circles were closely linked to some of the most
bloodthirsty, pro-League preachers. In this book women are leaders and, less
44 The term “emergent norm” comes from Ralph Turner and Lewis M. Killian,
Collective Behavior, 3rd. ed. ðEnglewood Cliffs, NJ, 1987Þ.
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commonly, martyrs or victims, but never aggressors.45 The shift from peni-
tence to charity that Diefendorf describes owes much to the political context:
in the short term, the turn to charity occurred around 1635, when the crown
raised taxes to pay for France’s entry into the Thirty Years’ War, and when a
poor economy caused many people to need assistance. In the larger context, the
shift reflects the civilizing process famously associated by Norbert Elias with
the rise of the state.
Diefendorf begins by describing self-inflicted violence, the penitential activi-
ties alluded to in the book’s title, arguing that the violence of the period helped
induce pious Catholic women to do violence to themselves. Many of these
women wore hair shirts and even studded iron bands under their clothes, and
they practiced other forms of physical mortification as well ð67Þ. In addition to
practices that induced pain, early seventeenth-century Parisian nuns humiliated
themselves: “Prioresses ordered penitent nuns to eat on the refectory floor instead
of at the table, to confess their imperfections out loud to the assembled commu-
nity, or to parade through the convent wearing a noose around their neck and
crying out for mercy” ð148Þ. Diefendorf concludes that “the trauma of civil war
awakened in women affiliated with both political factions a powerful desire for
the expiation of sin” ð23Þ. Andrew Barnes has made a similar argument about
members of male confraternities, suggesting that in sixteenth-century France
these men increasingly engaged in penitential practices because they “allow½ed
the participants to relieve themselves of their fears of what sectarian conflict was
doing to the social fabric and their inability to stop it.”46 Neither provides proof
that the frequency of penitential practice was uniquely high in late sixteenth-
century France. Diefendorf argues that most Parisian convents had relaxed their
observanceof theirRulesprior to the late sixteenth-century reformmovement ð51–
58Þ, but this is a recurring pattern in the history of medieval and early modern
Christianity. It would take much more evidence to prove that penitential practices
increased in the later sixteenth century compared to the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. Diefendorf argues that for many of the pious Catholic women of the
later sixteenth century, penitential practices were “fundamental to the process of
abnegation” ð91Þ that served “as a means of activating oneself to serve as God’s
tool or agent” ð90Þ. Diefendorf calls this “active mysticism,” that is, a form of
mysticism that was supposed to infuse the spirit with holiness so that the believer
could better discern and perform God’s will on earth.
Diefendorf’s key argument is that beginning in the mid-1630s Catholic reli-
gious and their noble patronesses switched to a new style of piety that was
45 Diefendorf does describe how some royalist Catholic women were held hostage
by the League ð43–46Þ.
46 Andrew E. Barnes, “Religious Anxiety and Devotional Change in Sixteenth Cen-
tury French Penitential Confraternities,” Sixteenth Century Journal 19 ðAutumn 1988Þ:
389–406, quotation at 397.
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designed to ameliorate society’s problems. Her most important piece of evi-
dence for this is the simple table ð136Þ “Religious Houses for Women Built in
Paris between 1604 and 1650,” which lists houses by founding dates and gives
their “type” ðcontemplative or activeÞ and the order with which they were af-
filiated. The table shows clearly that prior to the early 1630s contemplative
houses dominated, while afterward active ones did. Thus Diefendorf argues
that women caused a major shift in Catholic spirituality, since aristocratic
women were responsible for founding the convents by giving the money to
build them. Beyond the shift in the type of Parisian convents constructed, it is
also important that despite the high cost of real estate, a great many women’s
orders established houses—forty-eight between 1604 and 1640 ð135Þ—testify-
ing to the strength of the religious revival.
To raise money, houses adopted a variety of measures that allowed donors
special privileges, even when this involved bending the rules governing tradi-
tional female monasticism. Many houses had to allow lay donors to board with
them for a fee ð163–67Þ, which weakened the strict rules of claustration. François
de Sales created an order where such visits, even from married women, were
encouraged, so that lay women could be taught spiritual practices. More broadly,
de Sales “wanted to change the tone of religious life and make it more appealing
by insisting on the joy to be found there” ð181Þ.
Even when new orders eventually adopted stricter claustration rules, physi-
cal self-punishment waned. The teaching Ursuline order began as an association
of lay women; only later did it become an order where the women took the tra-
ditional vows, following the Augustinian rule. Madeline Luillier founded the first
house of the new order; she ordered the convent to be constructed it so that the
school was located outside an inner wall so that the nuns could teach and still be
enclosed ð124–30Þ. Other orders of nuns worked with repentant prostitutes ð183Þ
and sick women ð188Þ. Diefendorf concludes, “where earlier biographies told of
self-starvation, flagellation, and bleeding bodies, later ones were more likely to
say only that the devout lady worked very long hours, neglected to eat regularly,
and did not get enough sleep” ð241Þ. Civilized discipline replaced more physi-
cally extravagant self-mutilation. This again is akin to Barnes’s arguments: he
concluded that beginning in the seventeenth century there was a shift from the
penitential piety he identified for the sixteenth century to “what can be called
Counter-Reformation spirituality—that particular combination of meditative
devotion and social activism first advanced in the sixteenth century by the
Jesuits.”47
47 Andrew E. Barnes, “From Ritual to Meditative Piety: Devotional Change in French
Penitential Confraternities from the 16th to the 18th Century,” Journal of Ritual Studies 1
ðSummer 1987Þ: 1–26, quotation at 3. See also his The Social Dimension of Piety:
Associative life and Devotional Change in the Penitent Confraternities of Marseilles
ð1499–1792Þ ðNew York, 1994Þ.
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Diefendorf’s sensitive description of this turning point in the history of
women religious is a major contribution to our knowledge. She gives two rea-
sons for the shift, although it is my impression that the first reason has ðunjustly,
in my viewÞ received more attention. First, Diefendorf argues that the movement
was subject to “an internal dynamic,” since “like any movement born of the ex-
treme emotions produced in moments of crisis, its ardor was bound to fade,” and
“the introspection the new teachings encouraged led ½the women’s focus to shift
from exteriorized gestures of corporal discipline to interiorized mortifications
of the will” ð242–43Þ. Second, Diefendorf argues that poor economic condi-
tions were a major impetus for the shift:
Catholic revival . . . evolved in response to . . . economic depression and war. . . . The
economic recovery that helped finance the first foundations gave way by the 1620s to
increasingly troubled times. Taxes rose precipitously on account of France’s covert, and
after 1635, open participation in the Thirty Years’ war. . . . ½Peasants were forced into
extremity. Unemployment rose and with it vagrancy and vagabondage. As depression
spread to the cities, poverty took on an increasingly visible face. Under these circum-
stances, it was natural that elites who had the money and will for charitable giving should
find it more urgent to help ease the popular misery than to support the voluntary poverty
of contemplative nuns. ð244Þ
One advantage of the second, “external” argument is that it makes better sense
of the timing of the change. Why should the movement’s ardor happen to change
in the 1630s? Diefendorf points to a generational shift ð240–41Þ, but the term
is notoriously slippery, and the mid-1630s were in any case more than a full
generation after the height of the Wars of Religion. Even arguing that economic
problems caused the change diverts attention away from the larger context. As
Barnes and Evennett argue, this change is part of a much broader shift in religious
feeling.
It seems to me that the best large-scale theoretical structure in which to
understand this shift is that proposed by Norbert Elias’s The Civilizing Process
ð1969Þ. Surely, Christians’ declining interest in inflicting physical pain on them-
selves was part of the shift toward a greater emphasis on personal hygiene, fall-
ing murder rates, the decline of judicial torture, and so on that have become part
of the Elias model.48 Elias argued that this process was caused by the rise of
the early modern state; as its tax-collecting apparatus grew, it became more and
48 On falling murder rates, see Pieter Spierenburg, A History of Murder: Personal
Violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present ðMalden, MA, 2008Þ; Andrew
Linklater and Stephen Mennell, “Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and
Psychogenetic Investigations—an Overview and Assessment,” History and Theory 49
ðOctober 2010Þ: 384–411, provides a recent overview. See also Peter Sahlins, “The Royal
Menageries of Louis XIVand the Civilizing Process Revisited,” French Historical Studies
35 ðSpring 2012Þ: 237–69, and the references therein.
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more important to maintain internal stability and cohesion. The main difficulty
with this argument is that although the link is intriguing, it only postpones the
question of what caused the rise of the state. Nonetheless, it is hard not to con-
clude that the political and social context powerfully shaped the shifting reli-
gious ideals that Diefendorf documents.
VI. Conclusion
The books reviewed here show that if Protestantism began when clerics in the
Circle of Meaux contemplated theology, from the outset the movement required
elite political support—provided by Marguerite de Navarre above all—and
conversions increased dramatically only when Protestant critiques resonated
with the political context. Meaux broke up under threat; some of its members
remained within the Catholic Church while others rejected it, many of them
fleeing into exile. Farel was among the most important of the latter, establish-
ing himself as leader of the new church in Geneva and writing a number of im-
portant, emotional, and influential works on prayer and theology. Marguerite
greatly assisted French evangelicals by patronizing them and protecting them
from the authorities; her network also undoubtedly assisted them intellectually
and spiritually by fostering a community of ideas. However, over the course of
the 1530s the frustrated evangelical community began to radicalize and slipped
more and more from Marguerite’s influence. By the early 1540s Calvin had
created a new network of people and institutions, centered in Geneva. His in-
fluence, both through his theology and the institutions he built, greatly unified
French evangelicals.
Nonetheless, Protestantism was a highly demanding, if also highly reward-
ing, faith that struck many contemporaries as overreaching and unfair rather than
pure and noble. French evangelicals tended to find a receptive audience among
frustrated political outsiders who liked its clear moral categories, while more
conventional souls rejected it. It seemed in the 1540s that a movement of out-
siders was unlikely to become France’s majority faith. But Protestant conver-
sions mounted dramatically beginning in the mid-1550s, along with discontent
with the crown, especially in the towns of the “Protestant crescent” in the Midi.
Again, the political context was key, since at the height of these tensions Henri II
died unexpectedly, leaving the fifteen-year-old François II ðr. 1559–60Þ on the
throne. After his early and painful death, he was succeeded by the ten-year-old
Charles IX. This collapse of authority had the worst effects on the nation’s sta-
bility, and the country slid into civil war.
The war became the theater for a variety of political agendas. Protestants fa-
vored a greatly expanded role for the Estates General, which would meet reg-
ularly to provide a popular voice in politics. There is good evidence that even the
Guises, who have traditionally been seen as extremely ideological Catholics, in
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fact positioned themselves at the head of the Catholic party to further their family
interests. Even the most religiously motivated Catholics were prepared to com-
promise with Protestants so long as the Protestant movement was contained; this
was especially true once the aftermath of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre
proved that Protestantism could not be eliminated. The peace provided a
virtually unparalleled opportunity for reforms because the war had demonstrated
that the nation faced grave ills that justified fundamental change—everything was
in a state of flux. Some of the crown’s attempted reforms were traditional, but
others, including the calling of the Estates General, could, had they continued,
have resulted in very substantial changes to the French constitution. However, the
Estates General failed to pass realistic legislation to solve the nation’s problems
and refused to approve new taxes. The crown was forced to rely on expedients,
and was unable, despite its pledges, to renounce venality. Nonetheless the crown
negotiated a peace inaugurated by the Edict of Poitiers ð1577Þ that proved sur-
prisingly durable and allowed the crown to continue its work of reconstruction.
The Wars of Religion could easily have ended at this point, but Henri III failed
to produce a son and his last remaining brother died in 1584, making the Prot-
estant leader, Henri of Navarre, the heir presumptive. Catholics feared that his
accession would permit the Protestant movement to renew its campaign to
convert the country, and Protestant hopes were renewed. War broke out again
and lasted longer than all of the previous wars combined. Catholic worries only
eased when Navarre converted, leading eventually to the end of the wars for-
malized by the Edict of Nantes. Nantes was extremely similar to the Edict of
Poitiers and gave Protestants relatively little freedom to proselytize, although
it did guarantee their personal safety. If the second round of fighting frustrated
participants who thought the issues had already been settled, the process tended
to reward pragmatic politicians like Henri IV rather than stern ideologues like the
more extreme members of the Catholic League.
In the early seventeenth century the crown took a more laissez-faire approach
to religious issues. Henri IV was reluctant to use significant state pressure to en-
courage the conversion of local Protestant communities, although Jill Fehleison’s
study of the diocese of Annecy-Geneva suggests this strategy was necessary for
the restoration of religious unity. Collective rituals such as the Forty Hours de-
votions were particularly effective means of converting communities. However,
under Henri IV’s reign and especially that of his successor, Louis XIII, the re-
construction of Catholic institutions began and noblewomen in particular patron-
ized a dramatic increase in women’s religious houses—over forty in Paris alone.
In the 1630s, in response to worsening social conditions and as part of the gen-
eral trend toward greater state control and increasing self-discipline first noted
in Elias’s Civilizing Process, these noble Catholic women turned their patron-
age away from physically punishing penitential orders toward charitable orders,
women who worked with the poor, ill, and ignorant. The result was that
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noblewomen helped strengthen the state, although they acted without direct state
intervention by creating a network of institutions that expressed God’s love
while also fostering social peace. The change in emphasis strikingly paralleled
sixteenth-century Protestant demands, which suggests that the women were re-
sponding to the needs of society rather than to specifically Catholic theological
concerns. The effect of the Wars of Religion was thus to reinforce the central role
of the monarchy, reduce the power of the Estates, entrench venal office, and civ-
ilize and discipline French subjects.
Although as a result of recent work we have a much clearer picture of the
evolution of French religious history in the aftermath of the Reformation, there
are still a number of potentially fruitful research areas in French Reformation
studies. I want to highlight two subfields that have been somewhat underrepre-
sented in recent years: culture and gender. Sixteenth-century France was an
extraordinarily intellectually creative period, rich in literary figures such as Mon-
taigne, Rabelais, Marguerite de Navarre, and Ronsard, religious figures like
Calvin, political theorists like Bodin and the monarchomachs, and pamphleteers.
The publication of Denis Crouzet’s Les guerriers de dieu ð1991Þ, which heralded
the arrival of cultural history in sixteenth-century French historical studies, might
have been expected to touch off a new wave of research by historians on these
texts. A recent article arguing that the Wars of Religion helped create the pre-
conditions for the Higher Criticism that was crucial to the Enlightenment sug-
gests one fruitful avenue for future research.49 I also hope that Diefendorf’s From
Penitence to Charity encourages further work on gender and religion, for which
the records of the Protestant consistories, for example, provide considerable
source material. Suzannah Lipscomb has begun work on this, but many other
topics are worthy of investigation.50 I suspect, for example, that consistorial
records could be used to examine issues of women and work, along the lines
of Sheilagh Ogilvie’s A Bitter Living ð2003Þ. Hugues Daussy and Philip Benedict
are currently finishing books that should add to our knowledge of the “wonder
years” of the French Reformation, the period from the mid-1550s through the
early 1560s when Protestants confidently expected to become the majority.
Methodologically, the books under review here suggest that there is still a lot
of mileage in sociocultural approaches to sixteenth-century French history. Be-
yond methodology, Crouzet’s most substantial impact was his “attempt to elab-
orate an interpretive system of the French sixteenth century crisis which accords
primacy to the religious factor.”51 In particular, Crouzet insisted on the im-
49 Dmitri Levitin, “From Sacred History to the History of Religion: Paganism, Judaism,
and Christianity in European Historiography from Reformation to ‘Enlightenment,’” His-
torical Journal 55, no. 4 ð2012Þ: 1117–60, at 1160.
50 Suzannah Lipscomb, “Maids, Wives, and Mistresses: Disciplined Women in Ref-
ormation Languedoc” ðDPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2009Þ.
51 Crouzet, Guerriers de dieu, 1:45.
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portance of eschatological feeling in the period preceding the civil wars. My
principal concern with Crouzet’s thesis was that it did not explain the sharp
regional contrasts in religious adherence in sixteenth-century France. Why should
Normans and Dauphinois find Protestantism more attractive than Bretons or
Auvergnats?
More important, however, I find it unhelpful to make sharp distinctions
between religion and politics. Even today many religious issues have political
implications; in the sixteenth century, the French crown and the French Catholic
Church were so tightly interwoven that it was impossible for religious choices
not to have strong political implications, which necessarily affected them. In
particular, the French Protestant movement wanted the support of the crown—
and if the crown chose to ally with the Catholic League instead, war would
necessarily follow. Beyond this, it seems to me that there is a danger that when
we ascribe a particular statement or action to religious feeling we exempt our-
selves from our duty to analyze it. There is an old joke among archaeologists
that if they find an artifact they cannot understand, “it must be religious.” His-
torians should avoid the analogous trap. Sincere religious feelings must not only
constantly contend with the stumbling blocks of real life: they must respond
intellectually to them as well. Accepting that reality is not reductive. It seems to
me that Carroll’s, Fehleison’s, and Reid’s books in particular show the fruitful
consequences of studying the relationship of religion and politics without pre-
supposing the primacy of either.
It would be foolish to deny that religious feeling and commitments—how-
ever arrived at—increased the bloodiness of the Wars of Religion. The religious
issue made Catholics feel that Protestants were an existential threat even though
Protestants were small and weak enough that Catholics also believed ðerro-
neouslyÞ they could be massacred with impunity. While I would not place the
emphasis Crouzet did on eschatological feeling—and none of the works re-
viewed here does either—more work is needed to understand how religion
mattered to the period. In particular, we know less than we should about the
religious consequences of the wars, and about how the intense, violent religious
disputes of the sixteenth century shifted in the late sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.52
Perhaps the most serious long-term consequence of the Wars of Religion is
that they shook but did not shatter the trajectory of the French state. Before the
52 Joseph Bergin is apparently working on these issues, and Jonathan Israel has devoted
large sections of his massive, controversial trilogy on the Enlightenment—Radical En-
lightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750 ðNew York, 2001Þ,
Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–
1752 ðNew York, 2006Þ, and Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and
Human Rights 1750–1790 ðNew York, 2011Þ—to the debates within the Huguenot
diaspora and between it and its Catholic opponents after 1685.
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Revolution of 1789, the Wars of Religion were the most serious popular upris-
ing that the French monarchy ever faced, and they provided a unique opportu-
nity for remaking the kingdom’s institutions. In the end, the wars strengthened
the monarchy because they demonstrated its centrality. Moreover, one of the
principal reasons why early modern Europeans respected the French crown
was its antiquity and its apparently divinely ordained ability to survive: unlike
George III or Catherine the Great, Louis XVI could boast of being in the direct
line of succession from kings who had reigned a thousand years earlier. The
monarchy grew in power and prestige as a the result of the Wars of Religion,
which eventually gave it the strength to revoke the Edict of Nantes and sup-
press Protestantism ð1685Þ. The Wars of Religion also permitted the monarchy
to reduce the strength of other potentially competing centers of power, includ-
ing the nobility and representative institutions, although the weakening of the
Estates General hindered the monarchy’s ability to raise funds. The wars also in-
hibited the reform of venal office. In that sense, Henri IV’s conversion created
the Old Regime, with its strengths—and its weaknesses.
Church and State in the French Reformation 861
